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Abstract—The Mirai Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) at-
tack exploited security vulnerabilities of Internet-of-Things (IoT)
devices and thereby clearly signaled that attackers have IoT
on their radar. Securing IoT is therefore imperative, but in
order to do so it is crucial to understand the strategies of such
attackers. For that purpose, in this paper, a novel IoT honeypot
called ThingPot is proposed and deployed. Honeypot technology
mimics devices that might be exploited by attackers and logs
their behavior to detect and analyze the used attack vectors.
ThingPot is the first of its kind, since it focuses not only on
the IoT application protocols themselves, but on the whole IoT
platform. A Proof-of-Concept is implemented with XMPP and
a REST API, to mimic a Philips Hue smart lighting system.
ThingPot has been deployed for 1.5 months and through the
captured data we have found five types of attacks and attack
vectors against smart devices. The ThingPot source code is made
available as open source.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) is gaining attention from both
industry and society. It is predicted that by 2020 tens of
billions of IoT devices will be deployed worldwide, creating
a wealth of data [9]. IoT devices often have limited resources,
posing new stringent requirements for IoT communications. A
plethora of protocols have been used and developed to adhere
to the IoT requirements. For example, the application-layer
protocols XMPP, CoAP, and HTTP are widely used in IoT
products. However, these protocols were designed for other
purposes, such as real-time communication, asynchronous
communication, and messaging, or they are new and possibly
not well tested. In either case, it is essential to understand their
security vulnerabilities, such that we can attempt to fix them.
Our approach to gaining such an understanding is to de-
velop, to the best of our knowledge, the first interactive IoT
honeypot, called ThingPot, which simulates an entire IoT
platform, rather than a single application-layer communication
protocol (e.g., Telnet, HTTP, etc.). A honeypot is a system
that captures and identifies malicious activities by simulating
a real system or protocol. It is intended to be attacked, but
since it is placed in a controlled environment any attacks
will be contained. This technology was initially proposed in
the late 90’s by The Honeynet Project [17], and continuously
developed since then by the IT security community evolving
into more complex deception techniques. In this way, the
attacker does not know (at least not initially) that the honeypot
is not a real system or device and would try to exploit it based
on known vulnerabilities. The attack strategies are recorded
by the honeypot, and may include network traffic, payload,
malware samples, toolkit used by the attacker, etc. Currently,
a few IoT honeypots exist:
• Telnet IoT honeypot [15]: This is a honeypot that imple-
ments a Telnet server to catch IoT malware.
• HoneyThing [12]: This is a honeypot that is designed for
TR-069 (CPE WAN Management Protocol).
• IoTPOT [14]: A honeypot to emulate Telnet services of
various IoT devices. IoTPOT consists of a frontend low-
interaction responder cooperating with a backend high-
interaction virtual environment called IoTBOX. IoTBOX
operates various virtual environments commonly used by
embedded systems for different CPU architectures.
• Dionaea [6] [16]: A honeypot framework that, among
others, implements an MQTT module.
• ZigBee Honeypot [7]: A honeypot that simulates a Zig-
Bee gateway.
• Multi-purpose IoT honeypot [11]: An IoT honeypot that
focuses on Telnet, SSH, HTTP, and CWMP.
A comprehensive honeypot that emulates the IoT platform
is currently missing. This gap is filled by ThingPot.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section
II introduces several popular IoT application protocols and
their security mechanisms. In Section III, we elaborate on
honeypot technology and present the design of ThingPot,
our IoT platform honeypot. Our ThingPot implementation has
been operated in the wild. Section IV gives our results from
the data collected by ThingPot. We conclude in Section V.
II. IOT APPLICATION-LAYER PROTOCOLS
Already many application-layer protocols have been used
for IoT communication, some of the more popular ones are
presented in the following:
• MQTT: Message Queue Telemetry Transport
MQTT is a messaging protocol and was released by IBM
in 1999. It uses the publish/subscribe pattern that runs on
top of TCP, so the client does not require updates.
• XMPP: Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol
XMPP is a communication protocol that provides basic
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instant messaging (IM) and presence functionality. It was
standardized by the IETF and has been widely used.
XMPP is extensible, since it allows the specification of
XMPP Extension Protocols (XEP) to increase function-
ality. New XEPs have been released to support IoT.
• AMQP: Advanced Message Queuing Protocol
AMQP is an open-standard application-layer protocol
that arose from the financial industry. It uses a pub-
lish/subscribe communication model and supports reli-
able communication.
• CoAP: Constrained Application Protocol
CoAP was designed for resource-constrained devices. It
is a request/response protocol that runs over UDP. It
supports QoS and uses a simple Stop-and-Wait retrans-
mission mechanism for confirmed messages [10].
• UPnP: Universal Plug and Play
UPnP is a set of network protocols that are used for the
discovery of network devices. It is a distributed, open-
architecture protocol, based on established standards such
as TCP/IP, HTTP, XML, and SOAP.
• JMS: Java Message Service
JMS is an Application Programming Interface (API)
for communication between applications or distributed
systems.
• HTTP REST
REST is an architectural style that was developed in
2000 [8]. It has been widely used in Machine-to-Machine
(M2M) communications and IoT platforms. It provides a
resource-oriented messaging system, where the resources
are accessible via URI and GET requests, and inputs are
accepted via PUT commands [9], [10].
• DDS: Data Distribution Service
DDS is a middleware protocol from the Object Manage-
ment Group (OMG) [13] that lies between the operat-
ing system and applications. It uses a publish-subscribe
scheme.
Table I summarizes the main properties of the aforemen-
tioned protocols. Table II lists their security mechanisms.
A representative IoT platform framework is shown in Figure
1. It includes an API to work and communicate with the
devices, instant communication protocols to communicate
between users and API, and the clients (users) that can reach
both via the API and instant communication protocols. The
individual protocols already might have some security vulner-
abilities, which may be augmented in a complex environment
were multiple protocols are integrated.
III. THINGPOT DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, ThingPot, our interactive IoT honeypot,
will be introduced. The open-source code of ThingPot is
available at [3]. In general, based on the level of interaction,
one could classify honeypots in three categories: (1) High
Interaction Honeypots (HIH): deployment of real systems;
(2) Low Interaction Honeypots (LIH): emulation of a system
or protocol; and (3) Medium Interaction Honeypots (MIH):
combination of both. ThingPot can be considered a MIH
Fig. 1. Representative framework of an IoT Platform.
or hybrid interaction IoT platform honeypot, whose platform
comprises XMPP/MQTT as HIH modules, while LIH device
emulation is done through a REST API. ThingPot simulates
the frontend, backend, IoT devices, and existing XMPP/MQTT
services (servers, clients, libraries), see Figure 2. All of these
components compose the IoT platform that hackers could
interact with.
Fig. 2. IoT Platform Simulation
A. ThingPot implementation
REST is used to build a backend API. Given its popularity,
we have selected XMPP as the IoT protocol for real-time
communication. The frontend is realized through a simple
HTTP web service. Figure 3 describes the physical topology
of our Proof-of-Concept (PoC) implementation of ThingPot.
Our ThingPot implementation includes the three main com-
ponents described in Figure 1. These components are orga-
nized as follows:
• XMPP nodes: Two nodes will be used for the XMPP
part: one node that runs the XMPP client services and
one node that runs the XMPP server services.
• REST nodes: Three nodes with public IP addresses are
used to implement the REST part.
• Controller: A computer is used for logging, data storage,
updating of the code, etc.
The services are running within an isolated (virtual) envi-
ronment to decrease the chance that the attacker can reach
MQTT XMPP AMQP CoAP UPnP JMS HTTP REST
Transport TCP TCP TCP UDP UDP Not specified HTTP
QoS Options Yes No Yes No Yes Addressed by W3C WG No
Architecture Pub/Sub Pub/Sub Pub/Sub Req/Res Req/Res Req/Resor Req/Res
Real-time No Near Real-time No Near Real-time No No No
TABLE I
PROPERTIES OF POPULAR IOT COMMUNICATION PROTOCOLS.
MQTT Simple User-name/password Authentication, TLS/SSL for data encryption
XMPP SASL authentication, TLS/SSL for data encryption
AMQP SASL authentication, TLS/SSL for data encryption
CoAP DTLS/IPSEC
JMS Vendor specific but typically based on TLS/SSL. Commonly used with JAAS API
SOAP Address by WS-Security
REST TLS/SSL plus application server authentication (HTTP server, AAA scheme, etc).
TABLE II
SECURITY MECHANISMS OF POPULAR IOT COMMUNICATIONS
PROTOCOLS.
Fig. 3. Physical topology of our ThingPot PoC.
the actual system behind the service emulation of ThingPot.
Moreover, on nodes 1 and 2, proxies are running as a backup
countermeasure in case the API is temporarily down, as well
as to provide a masking mechanism to hide certain information
about the backend API. The XMPP server could be either a
public server (e.g., xmpp.jp) or a self-hosted server.
Figure 4 shows a block diagram of our XMPP client
component. Table III shows the IP addresses and services on
each node. Nodes 1 and 5 are running on a Raspberry Pi (RPi)
deployed on different (docker) containers that can be reached
via different TCP ports. Nodes 2 and 3 are independent
instances running on different servers.
The left block (in red) of Figure 3 shows a potential attacker.
The upper part (in yellow) shows the “device” behind the API.
Through a specific port (see Table III) the attacker can reach
and interact with the honeypot. No public IP address is needed
for the XMPP client, since it only needs to connect to the
XMPP server to subscribe emulated devices.
In this simple, yet general, IoT architecture, we can identify
two main paths that the attacker could take to reach the
“device”, as shown in Figure 5. In the next subsection, we
will introduce the practical use case that we had ThingPot
simulate, to see which attack paths are used most in that use
case.
Node Service IP address Port
1 REST 94.210.X.X TCP/80
2 REST 83.84.X.X TCP/80
3 REST 84.19.X.X TCP/80
4 XMPP client internal server -
5 XMPP server 94.210.X.X TCP/5222&5269
TABLE III
IP ADDRESSES OF THE NODES IN OUR POC.
B. Use case: Philips Hue (smart lighting system)
In order to demonstrate the functioning of ThingPot, we
chose to mimic an existing IoT product, namely Philips Hue
(Phue).
Phue consists of wireless LED light bulbs and a wireless
bridge. The bulbs can be controlled using iOS and Android
apps or through the Meethue website [2], which is a web
frontend that communicates with the devices connected to
the bridge. Third-party implementations (source code) and
technical manuals [20] are available to explain how XMPP
can be used with Phue, which is what ThingPot will simulate,
see Figure 6. Four main parts are involved:
• XMPP server: The XMPP server is for the XMPP com-
munications. It transfers all the messages between the
XMPP clients.
• Phue devices: This part includes the Phue Bridge (a
hub) and the smart lamps. The Phue Bridge communi-
cates wirelessly with the smart devices through ZigBee,
whereas the communication with the Phue server and
users frontend is performed through a REST API. The
Phue bridge has all the information of the connected
devices.
• PC-integrator of Phue and XMPP: [20] introduced a
way to integrate XMPP with Phue devices. Through this
integrator each smart device can have a JID, such that the
user can send messages to the JID to control the lights.
This integrator is a script that uses the sleekxmpp and
Phue libraries.
• XMPP client: Users can apply for an XMPP account on
any public XMPP server and then communicate with the
Phue devices through XMPP.
1) Simulated scenario: One feature of a honeypot is “bait-
ing”, which means the honeypot should convince the attacker
to believe that it is a real system with vulnerabilities.
Our simulated scenario is a Philips Hue system that has
two smart bulbs connecting to one Phue bridge. The Phue
bridge API has a public IP address. An XMPP client is used
to communicate with the server. A JID has been registered
on an XMPP server for controlling and monitoring one smart
bulb.
Fig. 4. Block diagram of our XMPP client.
Fig. 5. Attack paths.
2) REST implementation: Our ThingPot PoC contains a
RESTful API that simulates the behavior of the Phue bridge
API. The DjangoREST framework is used to build the API.
Figure 7 describes the block diagram of the REST module of
the honeypot. From the block diagram we can see that the
honeypot REST is divided into two parts, the API and the
manager. This structure is based on the Django design, where
a manager is used for managing the API and the API realizes
the API. It harbors 6 components:
• URLs: This maps URL patterns (simple regular expres-
sions) to Python functions (views).
• views: This is the Python code that takes requests and
returns responses.
Fig. 6. Philips Hue & XMPP integration.
• Data Resource: This includes three JSON files that form
a template for response. template and config follow the
format of the Phue bridge resource data structure. tempfile
is an additional feature of the honeypot implementation
that the real Phue bridge does not have. It is designed to
Fig. 7. Block diagram of the honeypot REST implementation.
allow the attacker to obtain more information about the
“device”.
• GetTemplate: This is a class that can be called by views.
It handles the response to incoming requests, managing
what to respond and calling the correct data from the
Data Resource.
• Service: Service is a class for some specific functions,
such as generating a random string, parsing the HTTP
header, etc.
• middlewarelogrequest: A customized middleware is built
and placed under the API. It parses all the incoming
requests and logs information in JSON format. Section
III-B3 explains the details of our log system.
3) Logging system: Each part (REST and XMPP) of the
honeypot has its own logging system.
REST logs
The REST logging system classifies the logs into two classes:
(1) normal Django console log and (2) the incoming requests
and corresponding responses. The Django console logs all the
events performed by the REST subsystem. An important fact
is that the framework stores on the log every single request
and its corresponding response, even if the received request is
invalid. This is especially useful for further data analysis, since
an invalid request might be part of malicious or anomalous
activity from the attacker. The nature of invalid requests can
be defined not only by the format of the HTTP request, but
also when the payload does not correspond to an expected
format used by the Phue specification.
XMPP logs
The XMPP logging system also has two classes of logs.
Since the XMPP honeypot is based on sleekxmpp and phue-
lib, a class – called XMPP system log – is formed by the
logs generated by these libraries, showing the status and
information about them. The other class of logs is similar to
the requests log of the REST honeypot. It is in JSON format
and is called the XMPP traffic log, because it stores all the
traffic, including the incoming and outgoing messages through
XMPP chat or XML stream to the server and the interaction
with the API (HTTP request and response).
The “shared id” method
The JID on the XMPP client honeypot is linked to the “smart
bulb” on the REST honeypot, creating some inter-dependency.
We have adopted a “shared id” to link the log entries of the
REST JSON log and the XMPP JSON log. When receiving a
message from the XMPP part, the log system will generate a
“shared id” that is based on the related JID and the current
timestamp. Then this generated “shared id” is written in the
header of the HTTP request to the API and transferred to
the REST honeypot. When the REST honeypot receives this
request, the “shared id” is saved in the JSON entry of the
REST JSON log, which allows us to correlate the logs based
on the “shared id”.
IV. DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
In this section, we present the data that were collected
by our ThingPot. ThingPot was running from June 22th till
August 7th. During that time, logs from each node were
taken. The captured requests can be classified as: targeted,
untargeted, and undefined. “Targeted” means that the request
is explicitly directed at the node, rather than a general (un-
targeted) scanning. “Undefined” means it is not clear whether
the request was targeted or not. In total, 113,741 requests were
captured. Table IV shows the number of targeted, untargeted,
and undefined requests. In the column “Targeted?”, 3means
that it is a targeted request, 7means untargeted, and “-” means
undefined. We can see that around half of the requests were
Targeted? Count Percentage
3 47,297 41.5%
- 10,444 9.2%
7 56,000 49.2%
TOTAL 113,741
TABLE IV
DISTRIBUTION OF REQUESTS CLASSIFIED BY TARGETED OR NOT.
targeted.
Most requests were HTTP REST requests, see Table V.
The requests starting with “/api” are likely targeted requests,
because all the valid URLs that are defined by the API
honeypot start with “/api”. By observing possible correlations
“/api”? Count Percentage
3 48705 42.9%
7 64760 57.1%
TOTAL 113465
TABLE V
DISTRIBUTION OF HTTP REST REQUESTS.
between URL, IP addresses, request type, request content
(body), user agent, and HTTP status code, we might be able
to understand the attacks and recognize an attack pattern.
The user agent can be considered a unique id for the data
caught. Each user agent might behave differently, but requests
from the same user agents likely display a similar behavior.
Correlating the user agent with other values could be helpful
to understand the attacks. Our logs reveal that many requests
came from user agents who resemble a web browser. It could
be that the requests originated from some plugins of a web
browser, or the attacker was using a web browser to hide his
real user agent.
Table VI shows the correlation between user agent, the
request type, and number of IPs. Each line reflects one user
agent. By analyzing the correlation between user agent and
request type and status, as well as checking details (URLs,
body) of part of the log, a summary based on each user agent
can be given:
• Mozilla/5.0 Jorgee:
“Jorgee” is malware that tries to make use of the SQL
web admin flaws [19]. It appeared 48460 times in total,
with 360 IPs involved, from June 28th to August 2nd and
occurs daily. Each IP sent around 200 to 400 requests. All
the request types were HEAD (which is similar to GET).
The URLs had keywords “db”, “admin”, “pma”, “php”,
“sql”, “web”, “database”, and “my”. The URL was the
permutation and combination of these words. This user
agent only appeared in the log of node 3.
• shooter:
This user agent might have been created manually. It
generated 31567 requests on the honeypot, with 92 IPs
involved. TOR technology was used to hide the source IP.
The requests dated from July 19th to July 20th and arrived
every 1 to 4 seconds. All the requests’ URLs were “/api/”
with the POST method and a specific body content.
Figure 8 shows a sample log entry. From this entry, we
can see that the body content has a well organized format
that follows the format of the Philips Hue data structure.
A replay of this request was done on a real Philips Hue
White. The reply from the real Phue bridge was an error
message saying that the parameter is not available.
• Mozilla/5.0 SF/2.10b:
This is the default user agent for Skipfish [4]. 7 IPs were
involved with 9229 requests in total. The requests were
GET, PUT, or FOO. Skipfish is a scanning tool that was
designed for security checks, but it could also provide
useful information to attackers.
• botlight:
2984 requests were received from this user agent. The
burst of requests started at July 19th 14:27 and lasted till
15:50 the same day. All requests were POST requests
with the same URL “/api/list/”. 21 IPs were involved
and TOR was used. Figure 9 shows one log entry from
user agent “botlight”. The body content of the requests is
following the multipart/form-data, which is used for file
upload, but there are also a lot of %s and 0s, which might
be characteristic of fuzzing (a technique that provides
invalid or random data as input to find bugs).
• 000modscan:
000modscan only used POST requests with 12
IPs involved. The requests happened on July 5th
from 10:22 till 11:59. The URL contained the
patterns /api/philips/hue/{32 chars}, /api/philips2/hue-
link/{32 chars}, /api/belkin/wemo/{32 chars}, and
/api/philips1/hue/{32 chars}. {32 chars} means a
random 32 long string that contains only digits and
lower-case letters. These POST requests had content that
was similar to the body of “botlight”.
• httpget:
The requests from user agent httpget were all HTTP GET
requests, with 7 IPs involved. The requests happened in
two periods: one on July 5th from 12:02 till 12:18 and
the second on July 6th from 11:34 till 11:46. The URLs
followed three patterns: /api/phi/light/{32 chars}/tokens,
/api/{32 chars}/tokens, and /api/{32 chars}. Since both
days contained the URL pattern /api/32 chars/tokens, we
assume that the requests originated from one source.
• Mozilla/5.0(WindowsNT5.1;rv:32.0)Gecko/20100101
Firefox/31.0:
All the requests were HTTP GET requests, with 14 IPs
involved, although most of the requests were from IP
91.196.50.33. The requests dated from June 28th to July
31st, 2 to 5 times per day. The URL of most requests
was /http:/testp3.pospr.waw.pl/testproxy.php. This is a
URL to look for open proxies.
• 0000modscan:
All the requests from user agent “0000modscan”
were GET requests, with 12 IPs involved. The
requests happened on July 5th from 09:37
to 09:42. The URLs of the requests were
/api/tplink/light/{32 chars}, /api/philips/hue/{32 chars},
/api/phi/light/{32 chars}, /api/philips2/hue-
link/{32 chars}, /api/belkin/wemo/{32 chars}, and
/api/philips1/hue/{32 chars}. This was an HTTP GET
scan targeting smart light devices.
• Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh;Intel Mac OS X10.11; rv:47.0)
Gecko/20100101 Firefox/47.0:
The requests were only from two IPs: 183.129.160.229
(193 times) and 60.191.38.77 (82 times). All were GET
with the URL /. The user agent is from a Mac operating
system with a Firefox web browser. By checking the time
of the requests, they were likely sent by someone who
found the proxy and requested the data resource manually.
• ioscan:
All the requests from user agent “ioscan” were HTTP
GET requests, with 2 IPs involved. The requests hap-
pened on July 4th from 13:58 till 14:00. All its URLs
followed the pattern /api/hue/{0-216}, where {0-216} is a
number that ranges from 0 to 216. This can be considered
a targeted scan, since “hue” is a keyword of the honeypot.
• Python-urllib/2.7:
Python-urllib/2.7 is a Python library for fetching data
across the World Wide Web [1]. The requests from user
agent “Python-urllib/2.7” were all HTTP GET requests,
with 3 IPs involved. 94 of the requests happened on July
1st from 01:10:09 till 01:10:19, i.e. 94 requests in 10
seconds, and all came from IP 185.77.172.42. From this
we can see that there must have been a script running.
The URL of these requests seems quite random, but in
general was looking for vulnerabilities of the SQL web
Count User Agent Type of Request Number of
IPs
48460 Mozilla/5.0 Jorgee HEAD: 48460 360
31567 shooter POST: 31567 92
9229 Mozilla/5.0 SF/2.10b GET: 9171 PUT:
29 FOO: 29
7
2984 botlight POST: 2984 20
2378 000modscan POST: 2378 12
1867 httpget GET: 1867 7
622 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 5.1; rv:32.0) Gecko/20100101
Firefox/31.0
GET: 622 14
607 0000modscan GET: 607 12
275 Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.11; rv:47.0)
Gecko/20100101 Firefox/47.0
GET: 275 2
248 ioscan GET: 248 2
96 Python-urllib/2.7 GET: 96 3
TABLE VI
TOP 20 USER AGENTS FROM THE PROXY LOGS.
Fig. 8. One of the log entries from user agent shooter.
Fig. 9. A log entry from user agent botlight.
admin.
A. Findings interpretation
Table VI summarizes our logs and in the following we
discuss the main types of attacks found.
Targeted attack that is trying to take control
The attack was an HTTP POST request with a specific HTTP
body. The HTTP body was JSON-format data similar to the
format of a real reply of the Philips Hue bridge. One example
is shown in Figure 8. The instruction of the Philips Hue API
says that to control the Hue device, a POST request with a
JSON body and a valid URL should be sent to the Philips
Hue bridge. This particular attack was simulating such a
request to change the value of the Philips Hue bridge. Hence,
the attacker already assumed that the implementation was
Philips Hue and knew how to control it.
Attack with the body following the multipart/form-data
format
This was an attack that used HTTP POST with a specific
body content. The body contents from for example “botlight”
and “000modscan” had very similar HTTP POST requests:
--------------------------{16_chars}\r\n
Content-Disposition: form-data; name=\"on
\"\r\n\r\ntrue\r\n-------------------------
-{16_chars}\r\nContent-Disposition: form-
data; name=\"productid\"\r\n\r\n{random_pay
load}\r\n--------------------------{16_char
s}--\r\n
where {16 chars} is a random 16-long string containing
only lower-case letters and digits. {random payload} is
something random, which “botlight” filled with “%0000”
and “000modscan” filled with nothing. An other user agent
“mass” was also sending POST requests with this pattern,
and where {random payload} was filled with an extremely
long repeated (9944 times in one payload) “%A/telnet” or
“%A/xmpp”, or “%A/upnp”, apparently a fuzzing attempt.
Attack with URL
This kind of attack was through HTTP GET with URLs
following a specific pattern:
1) /api/philips/hue/{32 chars}
2) /api/phi/light/{32 chars}
3) /api/philips1/hue/{32 chars}
4) /api/philips2/hue-link/{32 chars}
5) /api/belkin/wemo/{32 chars}
6) /api/tplink/light/{32 chars}
7) /api/hue/{0-750}
8) /api/phi/light/{32 chars}/tokens
9) /api/{32 chars}/tokens
10) /api/{32 chars}
Where {32 chars} means a 32-long string that contains lower-
case letters and digits randomly. And {0-750} means a number
ranging from 0 to 750. All of these requests were targeted
scanning attacks.
General scanning tools or libraries
A number of scanning tools and libraries appeared in the
honeypot data:
• skipfish [4]
• Nikto [5]
• Jorgee: there is not much information about this, but it
appears to be a web scanner.
• masscan [18]: This was also found in the user agent list.
The source code address is also included in the header.
• Python library urllib [1]
• http://testp3.pospr.waw.pl/testproxy.php: It can reveal the
IP of the proxy in your network.
• Proxyradar: On https://proxyradar.com/ you can find
open proxies.
Other unrelated attacks
Attacks that were executing commands to find something, but
which were not related to the IoT platform were also found.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a design of an IoT platform
honeypot (ThingPot). Moreover, we have provided a Proof-of-
Concept (PoC) implementation of ThingPot, which is made
available as open source code, focusing on the IoT platform
use case of Philips Hue (smart lights system). Two important
components of that ThingPot PoC use case are an XMPP client
and a REST API. Our ThingPot PoC has been deployed and
captured real data for 1.5 months.
Our analysis of the captured data shows that there were
only few attacker activities (even generic scans or requests)
on the XMPP part. In fact, there were no direct requests
for the devices through the XMPP path. This supports the
statement that XMPP increases the complexity for attackers
to reach the IoT platform and devices. Other reasons could
be that, currently, attackers are not yet showing interest in
exploiting the flaws of XMPP on an IoT platform. Or attacks
on XMPP target mainly the XMPP server, which was out of the
scope of our ThingPot PoC. This does not mean that potential
security problems in using XMPP for IoT should not to be
taken into consideration. More work on the protection of the
XMPP accounts (prevention from being exposed, additional
authentication, ...) should be done to reach a more secure
XMPP-IoT Platform.
Our analysis of the data from the REST logs indicates that
the IoT platforms and devices have been noticed by attackers.
In particular, five main kinds of attacks were found. In general,
attackers are looking for devices like Philips Hue, Belkin
Wemo, TPlink, etc. In particular, they are interested in getting
information about the smart devices and to take over control of
them. Often, the attackers are using the TOR network to mask
their real source. The methodology that the attackers seemed
to prefer is first a general scanning to look for openings,
followed by a more targeted and specific attack via brute force
or fuzzing. An attack specifically targeting the Philips Hue was
also found.
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